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MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF*

Accommodating Tensions in the
Coastal Zone: An Introduction and
Overviewt
Roll on, thou deep and dark blue ocean-roll!

Ten thousand fleets sweep over thee in vain;
Man marks the earth with ruin-his control
Stops with the shore.
-George

Noel Gordon, Lord Byron'

INTRODUCTION

Even before the time Lord Byron penned this poetic warning, various
elements of American government sought to exert some semblance of
control over the land within the reach of the oceans and lakes which
define much of the nation's boundaries.2 From the time of our earliest
settlements, coastal land has been considered the most desirable for aesthetic, economic, and recreational reasons.' As America matured, even
*Assistant Professor of Law, Oklahoma City University. Emory University, B.A., 1974; Georgetown University Law Center, J.D., 1977; Harvard University, A.M., 1979.
tThe seed for this symposium was planted at a conference, devoted to the state of federal Coastal
Zone Management (CZM) and related coastal issues, sponsored by the Lincoln Institute Land Policy
Roundtable, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Subsequent developments-most notably funding decisions
made in Washington-forced serious re-thinking of the future of CZM and prompted revisions of
several of the papers presented before the Roundtable. In addition, a national conference on "Our
Nation and the Sea in the 1980s"-sponsored jointly by the New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection (NJDEP), Division of Coastal Resources; the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and
International Affairs, Princeton University; and the Coastal States Organization-was convened in
November 1981. Many fruitful suggestions for revisions of these papers were offered there and
subsequently incorporated. One additional paper, on the West Coast experience with CZM, was also
commissioned by the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy for this collection.
The three comparative articles included in the symposium, independent contributions to Natural
Resources Journal, provide important points of comparison with, and comprise a fitting complement
to, the U.S. pieces.
My editorial tasks were made less strenuous and, I believe, more worthy, by aid from the following
people: Charles Haar, Ralph Johnson, William Matuszeski, Marilyn McLeod, Amy Henrich, Jill
Friedlander, David Kinsey, Albert Utton, Jacqueline Jacobs, and Angela Berkowitz. Professor Haar
served a dual role as Chairman of the Land Policy Roundtable and as chief critic of editorial
contributions. The assistance of the Lincoln Institute, particularly Arlo Woolery, and of the NJDEP
are also greatly appreciated.
1. Childe Harold's Pilgrimage, Canto IV (1818).
2. See, e.g., the colonial ordinance of 1641-47, codified in THE BooK OF Ta GENERAL LAWES
AND LiBERTYES (1649), discussed in In re Opinion of the Justices, 365 Mass. 681, 685, 313 N.E.
2d 561, 565 (1974).
3. See, e.g., State ex. rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Ore. 584, 586, 462 P.2d 671, 673 (1969).
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as the population began to inhabit the great center of the continent, the
coast retained its magnetism. 4
In recent decades, two new movements-attendant with profound social, economic, and political ramifications-have been identified with the
coast: efforts to conserve the country's natural treasures and the race for
energy independence. The tensions and demands occasioned by these key
developments proved too much for the state and local mechanisms that
had been established to plan and manage activities within and affecting
coastal areas.5 Cries for a national mediatory presence culminated in the
passage of the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (CZMA),6 a controversial legislative scheme that has since been refined three times (in
1976, 1978, and 1980).'
The promulgation and implementation of the CZMA signified a dramatic break with federal legislative and administrative schemes created
in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The familiar "sticks"-threatened cutoffs of desperately needed funds,' new and expanded causes of action in
federal courts, 9 and detailed regulatory and statutory orders'°--were replaced by two attractive "carrots": substantial direct financial assistance
in the form of matching grants," and a provision mandating that federal
coastal activities must be consistent with approved state programs.12
As the contributions to this symposium testify, the twelve years which
have followed passage of the CZMA have witnessed a wide range of
experimentation in coastal area planning, development, and preservation.
CZM has attracted the attention, criticism, and study of activists and
experts (drawn from the public and private sectors and from academia)
in the environmental, energy development, land-use, and government
fields. What was, and remains, the only comprehensive zoning scheme
4. See generally WENK, THE POLITICS OF OcEAN 7-26 (1972) (discussion entitled "An Unsteady
Love Affair with the Sea").
5. The disastrous Santa Barbara oil spill in 1969 is perhaps the most familiar symbol of the risks
involved in failing to meet the demands of competing coastal uses.
6. Pub. L. No. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1982)).
For a detailed appraisal of the Act, see Chasis, The Coastal Zone Management Act: A Protective
Mandate, 25 NAT. REs. J. 21 (1985).
7. Pub. L. No. 94-370, 90 Stat. 1013; Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 690, 692, 693; Pub. L. No.
96-464, 94 Stat. 2064.
8. See, e.g., Highway Beautification Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-285, 79 Stat. 1028 (codified
as amended at 23 U.S.C. §§ 131, 135 note, 136, 319 (1982)).
9. See, for example, 42 U.S.C. §3610 (1982) (the fair housing enforcement provisions of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968).
10. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500,
86 Stat. 816 (originally codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982)).
11. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 1454-1455 (1982).
12. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c) (1982). A third incentive, assistance in the form of grants, loans, and
bond guarantees, is made available to coastal states through the Coastal Energy Impact Program
(CEIP), as provided by § 308. Id. § 1456a.
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national in scope, encompassing publicly and privately held property
alike, promises to hold the interest-and, on occasion, to raise the ireof politicians, energy companies, conservationists, professors, and bureaucrats for years to come, and with good reason.
Unlike "pure" environmental or "pure" energy development interest
legislation, the CZMA's chief focus is on the planning side, as suggested
by the term "management." In fact, it is this planning element-the
refusal to take a substantive stand on either side of the struggle between
conservation and resource development-that has led to the most heated
debates over the purpose and implementation of the decade-old program. 3
Yet, perhaps ironically, one telling measure of this tenuous, tightropewalking function lies in the amount of disapproval directed at the program
administrators from all sides: environmentalists, industry, local government, etc. 14 Balancing, diversity, coordination, comprehensiveness-these
terms (and not favoritism or prejudice) are brought up time and again to
describe the mission and conduct of CZM programs which seek to structure a meaningful and competent approach to the amorphous and crucial
problems of our coastal zone.' 5
In many ways CZMA presents an archetypal New Federalism blueprint,
for it attempts to restructure local, state, and federal relationships, often
placing the concerns and demands of the former two levels of government
over and above the usually ascendant third. With its declared emphasis
on management and planning, 6 as opposed to specific action and results,
the federal CZM structure fits well with the Reagan Administration's view
of the most beneficial role of the central government. Still, because
CZM funds are budget line items, the program has been subjected to
severe economic constraints, 8 a fate shared by other promising federal
cooperative projects.
Inevitably, this balancing act has led to disputes among officials of,
'

13. The most prominent example of this conflict is the struggle over the applicability of the Act's
consistency provisions to offshore oil and gas leasing. See infra text accompanying notes 39-55
(discussion of the United States Supreme Court's recent decision on this issue).
14. The first five papers in this symposium will acquaint the reader with most of the major
criticisms of federal CZM.
15. See, e.g., Finnell, Intergovernmental Relationships in Coastal Land Management, 25 NAT.
REs. J. 31 (1985).
16. E.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1452(2)(1) (1982) (state management programs to provide for "assistance
to support comprehensive planning, conservation, and management .. ").
17. See, e.g., Inaugural Address, 1981 PuB. PAPERs 1, 2 (Jan. 20, 1981):
It is my intention to curb the size and influence of the Federal establishment and to
demand recognition of the distinction between the powers granted to the Federal
Government and those reserved to the States or to the people. All of us need to be
reminded that the Federal Government did not create the States; the States created the
Federal Government.
18. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
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and interest groups appearing before, all three governmental strata. As
will become clearer in the articles which follow, certain interests have
come to favor a strong national presence while others champion decentralized control.' 9 In their attempts to attack the pervasive problems of
delay, inconsistent development, and coastal decay, the Office of Coastal
Zone Management (OCZM-now called the Office of Ocean and Coastal
Resource Management)2" and state and local officials have often found
themselves mired in a morass of territorial jealousy, confusion, overburdening red tape, and frustrating litigation. Moreover, intragovernmental disputes, often based on envy and mistrust, have made the
road
21
to efficient coastal management a rocky one in several instances.
The obvious tensions between developers and environmentalists also
come into clear focus when placed under the CZM microscope. In fact,
the history of federal CZM reflects an appreciable shift, as the 1970s
began, from public alarm over pollution, such as oil spills, to concern
for American energy independence and economic revitalization as the
decade drew to a close.2 2 If the pendulum begins to swing again in the
direction of conservation, it is important that the CZM machinery and
cooperative mentality remain in place, just as they presently serve the
nation's needs within a pro-development milieu.
OVERVIEW
The first five articles in this collection present the reader with a wideranging CZM portrait, at first narrowly focused and then progressively
expanded to a panoramic view. The inquiry begins with Sarah Chasis'
"The Coastal Zone Management Act: A Protective Mandate," a detailed,
albeit colored, description of the legislative blueprint: the CZMA, in its
original and amended forms. The following piece, "Intergovernmental
Relations in Coastal Land Management," Gilbert Finnell's careful study
of a central component of the CZM initiative, directs our attention to the
procedural aspects of the unique "cooperative federalism" 23 approach of
CZM.
19. Compare, for example, the Chasis and O'Connell articles in this symposium.
20. The change in name from the Office of Coastal Zone Management (OCZM) to the Office of
Ocean and Coastal Resource Management (OCRM) was part of a general reorganization of the
Commerce Department's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), effective November 28, 1982. OCRM was placed within the National Ocean Service of NOAA. [13 Current
Developments] ENv'T REP. (BNA) 1495 (December 31, 1982).
21. See, e.g., Hildreth & Johnson, CZM in California, Oregon, and Washington, 25 NAT. REs.
J. 103 (1985).
22. The New Jersey CZM experience, as portrayed by David Kinsey, is a sort of microcosm for
this phenomenon. Kinsey, CZM from the State Perspective: The New Jersey Experience, 25 NAT.
REs. J. 73 (1985).
23. For a discussion of this term in the coastal management context, see Miller, Offshore Federalism:Evolving Federal-StateRelations in Offshore Oil and Gas Development, 11 ECOLOGY L.Q.
401, 403 (1984).
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Our attention is shifted in the next article, Daniel O'Connell's "Florida's Struggle for Approval under the Coastal Zone Management Act,"
to the "real world" give and take involved in satisfying objective and
subjective statutory and administrative criteria before obtaining federal
approval for the program in a key coastal state. David Kinsey's "CZM
from the State Perspective: The New Jersey Experience," an insider's
"micro" view, takes the reader beyond the approval phase to the struggles
over, and actual implementation of, state and local coastal development,
environmental, and recreational programs.
The final domestic contribution-Richard Hildreth and Ralph Johnson's multistate study, "CZM in California, Oregon, and Washington"incorporates elements and approaches from the four previous pieces.
Hildreth and Johnson present some timely and troubling conclusions about
the theory and reality of coastal zone planning and development in the
United States.
Not surprisingly, certain patterns and themes arise from these varied
materials. The nature and prominence of the federal role in the CZM
drama is debated by three authors, each of whom places special emphasis
on the concerns and activities of one governmental branch. Chasis, true
to her position as advocate for the Natural Resources Defense Council,
takes Congress to task for overemphasizing procedure in the current CZM
statutory scheme and for making the federal overseeing role too weak in
regard to state program approval and implementation. Rather than faulting
CZM for being too decentralized or locally controlled, law professor
Finnell is most concerned with those instances of unnecessary and inefficient homogeneity imposed from above by federal regulation. To Finnell, judicial opinions, in which jurists attempt to balance and prioritize
the powers and responsibilities of the central and local governments,
present the most fertile source of inquiry. The long series of travails
documented in O'Connell's essay is punctuated by confrontations with a
demanding, if not obstinate, federal coastal zone program bureaucracy.
There is yet another potential source of tension that tends to surface
at times in the complex realm of coastal area management: the friction
among different branches of the same level of government. In sharp
contrast to the Tower of Babble that arose to thwart, for a time, Florida's
efforts, Kinsey depicts the successful accommodation of potentially debilitating internecine struggles over coastal land management. Kinsey's
hearty endorsement of one state program cannot be totally attributed to
bias, for other states have used New Jersey as a model of innovation and
efficiency.
Kinsey and O'Connell engage, as well, in a kind of dialogue concerning
the characterization of the proper constituency for CZM. In a sense, this
discussion seeks to identify the "audience" before whom each concerned
public and private sector party "struts and frets," seeking approval and
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support. O'Connell, the attorney, is convinced that there exists a constituency for the "improved or better management" envisioned by CZMA.
Thus, the state and federal programs need not be captured by (and therefore devoted to the goals and desires of) interest groups like developers,
energy companies, or environmentalists. 24
Kinsey, the planner and former state CZM official, takes a more cynical
stand, rejecting the notion of a good government constituency as mere
"wishful thinking." Sounding more like a lawyer, Kinsey asserts that
"public decisions are made through an adversarial process of consideration of multiple interests." Indeed, the current limbo status of federal
CZM' testifies both to the absence of one constituency powerful enough
to move the program forward and to the weakness of any "counterconstituency" seeking to eliminate the program altogether. We are thus
returned to the overall theme of this collection: the careful balancing that
is pursued within the geographic and political boundaries of the coastal
zone.
The darker side of intrastate competition (as well as some noted successes) is revealed by Professors Hildreth and Johnson. Perhaps their
most significant finding concerns yet another tension hidden beneath the
bubbly surface of coastal land planning and management, a tension that
arises only after the struggles for public recognition and approval have
been hard-fought and won. This conflict, between effective enforcement
and comprehensiveness, threatens either to enervate CZM to the point of
futility, or to turn CZM into a one-issue (e.g., a beach access or offshore
drilling) program to the detriment of less prominent, controversial, or
newsworthy coastal concerns. In a statement reeking of heresy to diehard
adherents of comprehensive CZM, yet grounded in common sense and
in a serious and careful study of the subject matter, Hildreth and Johnson
observe that, "Both the issues addressed and geographic coverage may
need to be narrowed [in California and Oregon], so that they are similar
to the more restricted ... programs. Unfortunately, to sacrifice comprehensiveness for enforceability may be the more realistic way to insure
meaningful program survival and continued federal support."
The key to the marked success, even survival, of CZM in the United
States lies in the ability of local, state, and federal program managers
and planners to reconcile the needs and desires of a wide range of parties
with the harsh realities of funding and administrative shortfalls. If we
indulge in the lawyer's favoritism of process at the expense of substantive
goals, or if we opt for paper-thin (though comprehensive) coverage over
limited and innovative experimentation, the legacy of this cooperative
24. The most prominent elaboration of the "capture theory" generally, is G. Kouxo, THE TRnwH
OF CoNsERVATIsM: A REINTERPRErATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-1916 (1963).

25. See infra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
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land-use scheme may well be years of internecine, intergovernmental,
economic, political, and legal disputes.
As a way of avoiding such a fruitless legacy, it is important that we
not only direct our attention to current programs and struggles at home,
but also to developments in economically crucial and environmentally
sensitive coastal areas abroad. The three comparative papers featured in
this symposium form a study in contrast and counterpoint for those interested in successful coastal planning and development in the United
States. Although the geographical, economic, and political contexts with
which they are concerned vary dramatically, the authors of these three
articles are all seeking to devise a framework for resolving many of the
same tensions posed by coastal area use and preservation that the five
initial pieces in the symposium address.
In "Existing Institutional Arrangements and Implications for Management of Tokyo Bay," Professors Kazuo Sumi and Ken Hanayama carefully
detail the perils of decentralized and uncoordinated planning in a key
coastal region. Patterns familiar to those acquainted with the coastal
history of the United States are retraced here: a shift in public (and
governmental) concern from economic revitalization to environmental
protection, stiff competition among neighboring communities for industry
and investment at the expense of uniform planning for development and
conservation, and a dearth of public concern except in the case of a severe
ecological disaster. It should be no surprise to those familiar with American CZM that critics of the Japanese system of local control are advocating a move away from the "complex patchwork of ad hoc measures"
toward "a comprehensive and an integrated approach to management of
Tokyo Bay."
Mark Valencia and Abu Bakar Jaafar, in "Legal and Institutional Issues
in the Environmental Management of the Malacca/Singapore Straits,"
present a series of choices designed to resolve the potentially devastating
impact of several competing uses in an environmentally sensitive area.
Mineral exploration and exploitation, shipping, rapid urbanization and
industrialization, tourism, and cultivation of crops are all taking their toll
on a region managed almost haphazardly by three nations, Malaysia,
Indonesia, and Singapore, and directly affected by many other users and
abusers from within and without the region. State or local officials in the
United States who feel unreasonably burdened by the amount of red tape
and control imposed from above need only review the crazy quilt of local,
national, regional, and international regulations and statutes asserted in
the Malacca/Singapore Straits area to realize that, indeed, ours is the
greener grass.
The concluding offering in this collection, Lakshman Guruswamy's
"Environmental Management in a North Sea Coastal Zone: Law, Insti-
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tutions and Policy," demonstrates the overwhelmingly reactive nature of
governments, local, national, and international alike. Despite the presence, even prominence, of technical experts close to the seat of power,
the state all too often considers the negative implications of a course of
action only after moving headlong down that course. So, in the North
Sea, it is only after years of exploration and development of energy
resources that the European Community is beginning to consider seriously
the reality, and not just the idea, of "an integrated environmental and
resource strategy." It can only be hoped that once a comprehensive study
is undertaken, such as that proposed here by Guruswamy, the advances
and mistakes of the unique cooperative scheme of U.S. CZM will provide
a fertile source of comparison and guidance.
26
In 1985, the CZMA is once again scheduled for reauthorization. It
is appropriate, therefore, to take the time to reconsider the accomplishments and drawbacks of the first years of operation under the statute as
the bases for the decisions to be made about coastal planning and management in the coming decades. Perhaps the greatest value of this collection of articles is that the reader is introduced to the full range of the
U.S. experience to date-from promulgation, to implementation, to early
operation-in one sitting.
To the editor goes not only the job of introducing, summarizing, and
comparing the pieces in the set, but also the privilege of discussing future
problems and prospects. That future is far from self-determined, for the
course of CZM has always been, and will continue to be, primarily in
the hands of legislative, executive, and judicial policymakers and interpreters.
While Congress has not as a body agreed on any amendments since
1980, the laboratory of state and local legislative bodies has produced a
number of innovative coastal experiments. In the absence of specific
federal orders and specifications, a wide range of programs has been
prodded and nurtured through CZM:
[C]oastal programs range from stringent regulation in California,
where a coastal property owner may be forbidden to build on his
own land, to permissive overseeing in Louisiana, where some conservationists complain that oil companies are allowed to mangle the
fragile shoreline at will.
In South Carolina, helicopter crews on regular patrol look for
landowners illegally diking marsh lands. In Massachusetts, no fewer
than 315 community conservation commissions coordinate with the
state in carrying out 27 coastal conservation policies.'
26. 16 U.S.C. § 1464 (1982).
27. Hill, FederalLaw on CoastalLand Use, After 12 Years, Is Having Wide Impact, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 16, 1984, at 36, col- 1.
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While some uniformity results from interaction, study, and exchange of
ideas, this process of experimentation and variation should continue to
be one of the hallmarks of the CZM program.
On the state and federal levels, the personality and politics of the chief
executive and his or her administration will continue to have a significant
impact on the future course of CZM. One need only look at the shift in
environmental policy from King to Dukakis in Massachusetts, from Brown
to Deukmejian in California, and from Evans to Ray in Washington to
appreciate the vulnerability of the best laid coastal plans.
In the District of Columbia, the result of the turnover in administrations
is best illustrated by comparing Jimmy Carter's endorsement of the last
year of his term as "The Year of the Coast," 2 8 with Ronald Reagan's
proposed $43.4 million cut in CZM funding for fiscal year 1982.29 Indeed,
former Interior Secretary James Watt's sweeping five-year oil and gas
leasing plan stands as the most prominent symbol of the administration's
coastal regime.30
What does the second Reagan term hold for CZM? Unfortunately for
those seeking a clear message, recent signals have been curiously mixed.
In an October 1983 hearing, Congressman Norman D'Amours of New
Hampshire, chairman of the House Oceanography Subcommittee, lambasted OCRM Director Peter Tweedt for "clearly ignoring" and "trying
to decimate" the CZMA.3" Moreover, in July 1984, much to the dismay
of environmentalists and several state governments, the Interior Department revealed plans for a second five-year Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)
oil and gas leasing plan.32 Yet, only one month before, Interior Secretary
William Clark voiced support for the idea of coastal state revenue sharing
from oil and gas leasing in the OCS. 3 1 It remains to be seen whether the
second Reagan term will witness a stronger commitment to environmental

28. Environmental Priorities and Programs, Message to the Congress, 1979 PUB. PAPERS 1353,
1362 (August 2, 1979).
29. Eliopoulos, CoastalZone Management:Programata Crossroads,Monograph 30, [13 Current
Developments] ENv'T REP. (BNA) at 8 (Sept. 17, 1982). President Reagan's plans met with some
stiff Congressional resistance, as did his CZM budget proposals over the following three years. In
1984, despite the President's renewed zero-budget proposal for state CZM grants, Congress appropriated $36 million for CZM state grants, a figure that compares well with Carter's last budget
figures. The President authorized this allocation as part of the supplemental appropriations for the
Commerce Department. Telephone interview with William Matuszeski, Deputy Assistant Administrator for Ocean Services and Coastal Zone Management (October 19, 1984).
30. Watt approved a final five-year oil and gas leasing plan-covering nearly one billion offshore
acres-on July 21, 1982. [13 Current Developments] ENV'T Ra. (BNA) 420 (July 30, 1982).
31. [14 Current Developments] ENV'T RPt'. (BNA) 989 (October 14, 1983).
32. [15 Current Developments] Emv'T REP. (BNA) 416 (July 13, 1984).
33. Pasztor, Reagan Is Moving Toward Giving States Larger Share of Offshore Leasing Money,
Wall St. J., June 13, 1984, at 12, col. 1.
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protection in general, as was hinted early in the presidential campaign. 34
As with any other program grounded in law and regulation, CZM has
as its ultimate arbiter the judiciary. While there have been some exceptions,35 generally the courts, as in the land-use field as a whole, have
been quite deferential to states and localities in their efforts to plan and
manage coastal regions in accordance with the tone and substance of the
CZMA. For example, a federal district court upheld the right of the
California Coastal Commission, in accordance with the consistency provision of the CZMA, 36 to review the Interstate Commerce Commission's
approval of plans to remove nearly seven miles of railroad tracks on the
Monterey Peninsula.37 Similarly, the U.S. Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, ruled that the Environmental Protection Agency acted arbitrarily and
contrary to the CZMA by insisting on grant conditions that, if enforced,
would have run contrary to state and local coastal planning decisions.38
It was left to five justices of the United States Supreme Court, in a
decision announced January 11, 1984, to provide the most significant
(and controversial) interpretation of the statutory foundation of CZM.39
Secretaryof the Interiorv. Californiaarose from the Interior Department's
plans to sell oil and gas leases on the OCS off the California coast. The
California Coastal Commission viewed these activities as "directly affecting" the coastal zone and demanded a consistency review in accordance with §307(c)(1) of the CZMA. 4 The demand was rejected by Interior.
The state, along with the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the
Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth, Friends of the Sea Otter, and the
Environmental Coalition on Lease Sale No. 53, instituted litigation against
the Interior Department, Secretary Watt and two other department officials, and the Bureau of Land Management, seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief.4' The federal district court and the Ninth Circuit Court
34. At a July 11, 1984, bill-signing ceremony held on Theodore Roosevelt Island on the Potomac
River, President Reagan stated that Americans must be "determined to avoid the waste of our
resources and destruction of the ecological systems on which these precious resources are based."
[15 Current Developments] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 411, at 412 (July 13, 1984).
35. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 39-55 (discussing the United States Supreme Court's
recent decision in Secretary of the Interior v. California).
36. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c) (1982).
37. Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. California Coastal Comm'n, 520 F. Supp. 800 (N.D. Cal.
1981).
38. Cape May Greene, Inc. v. Warren, 698 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1983).
39. Secretary of the Interior v. California, U.S. -_, 104 S.Ct. 656 (1984).
40. "Each Federal agency conducting or supporting activities directly affecting the coastal zone
shall conduct or support those activities in a manner which is, to the maximum extent practicable,
consistent with approved state management programs." 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1) (1982).
41. Secretary of the Interior v. California, 104 S.Ct. at 660 n. 3. In addition, Western Oil and
Gas Association and twelve of its members intervened as defendants, while some local governments
in California intervened as plaintiffs. Id.
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of Appeals agreed with the plaintiffs that a consistency determination was
required prior to the lease sale.4 2 The Supreme Court granted certiorari,
and heard oral arguments on November 1, 1983.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's majority opinion first noted the ambiguity of the phrase "directly affecting" and then turned to the legislative
history in an effort to clarify the meaning of the two words. She concluded
that the language was added to the CZMA as a compromise between a
broad House and a restrictive Senate interpretation: "The [House-Senate]
Conference accepted the Senate's narrower definition of the 'coastal zone,'
but then expanded § 307(c)(1) to cover activities on federal lands not 'in'
but nevertheless 'directly affecting' the zone." 43 Further study of the 1972
CZMA Conference Report led the majority to a dramatic (and nearly
determinative) assertion: "[W]e are impelled to conclude that the 1972
Congress did not intend §307(c)(1) to reach OCS lease sales. '
Justice O'Connor did not stop there, however; she proceeded to make
the following findings: (1) §307(c)(l) is "irrelevant to OCS lease sales,"4 5
an activity covered by § 307(c)(3), a section that "definitely does not
require consistency review of OCS lease sales." 46 (2) The 1978 amendments to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953 (OCSLA) confirm
that a lease sale is a distinct statutory stage that gives the lessee "only a
priority in submitting plans to conduct those activities" 47 (i.e., exploration, development, and production) that will trigger the consistency requirements of §307(c)(3)(B). (3) Even if §307(c)(1) were applicable, a
lease sale "grants the lessee the right to conduct only very limited,
'preliminary activities' on the OCS. "48 Granted, that right might come
at a high price;4 9 still, because federal approval may be denied at several
points down the line, "the possible effects on the coastal zone that may
eventually result from the sale of a lease cannot be termed 'direct."' 50
It would be difficult to craft an opinion that focused more narrowly on
statutory language qua language.5" The majority declared that Congress,
42. California ex rel. Brown v. Watt, 520 F. Supp. 1359 (C.D. Cal. 1981), modified, 683 F.2d
1253 (9th Cir. 1982).
43. Secretary of the Interior v. California, 104 S.Ct. at 662.
44. Id. at 666 (footnote omitted).
45. Id. at 667.
46. Id. (emphasis in original).
47. Id. at 670. The 1978 amendments to the OCSLA (Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 632) are
found at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1982).
48. Secretary of the Interior v. California, 104 S.Ct. at 672.
49. In his dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens noted, "In the lease sale at issue in this case,
$220,000,000 was bid on the disputed tracts." Id. at 679 n. 15.
50. Id. at 672.
51. The majority opinion is unsatisfactory not only because it ignores the broader implications
of the Court's findings. There are other serious shortcomings:
(1) Justice O'Connor's understanding of "directly affecting" went beyond even the
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not the Court, had made the policy choice5 2 and that the plaintiffs' (and
dissent's) contrary construction of the CZMA was "superficially plausible
but ultimately unsupportable." 53 Justice O'Connor did pay lip service to
the benefits of collaboration between state and federal agencies. 4 Ultimately, however, she and her colleagues paved the way for the ascendancy
of the latter's policies and goals over those of the former in the settingposition briefed by Interior, to the extent that all OCS activities conducted or supported
by a federal agency could be exempt from the consistency requirement of § 307(c)(1).
Id. at 661.
(2) The majority refused to consider four key post-1972 statements appearing in
congressional committee reports, as "of little help in construing the intent behind the
law actually enacted." Id. at 666 n. 15. This posture is contrary not only to the dissent
("this nevertheless qualifies as the view of a subsequent Congress and is not without
persuasive value" (Id. at 688 n. 36)), but also to previous opinions penned and endorsed
by O'Connor and other members of the majority. See, e.g., Bell v. New Jersey and
Pennsylvania, 103 S.Ct. 2187, 2194 (1983) (O'Connor: "the view of a later Congress
.. does have persuasive value"); Bowsher v. Merck & Co., 103 S.Ct. 1587, 1595
n. 12 (1983) (O'Connor: "subsequent congressional rebuffs of GAO requests for
expansion of its access authority are instructive both with regard to the GAO's view
of the limits of the 1951 legislation and Congress' apparent reluctance to broaden that
legislation."); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 2032-2034 (1983)
(Chief Justice Burger considered, in detail, failed congressional efforts to modify IRS
rulings); Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657, 666 n. 8 (1980) (Chief Justice Burger:
"while arguments predicated upon subsequent congressional actions must be weighed
with extreme care, they should not be rejected out of hand as a source that a court
may consider in the search for legislative intent.") The majority would have done well
to heed Chief Justice John Marshall's advice: "Where the mind labours to discover
the design of the legislature, it seizes every thing from which aid can be derived."
United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805).
(3) Important questions were left unresolved by the majority's opinion. See, e.g.,
Secretary of the Interior v. California, 104 S.Ct. at 660 n. 3 (standing of respondents
other than California not addressed); Id. at n. 5 ("who holds final authority to determine
when sufficient consistency has been achieved" not decided); Id. at 663 ("whether
any OCS activities other than oil and gas leasing might be covered by §307(c)(1)"
not determined).
(4) The majority displayed an attitude toward Congressional debate and decisionmaking that was naive at best, misleading at worst. See those parts of Justice Stevens'
dissent addressing the majority's questionable use of legislative history. Id. at 68388.
52. Some members of Congress have reacted to the majority's opinion by proposing amendments
to the CZMA, changes designed to ensure that federal OCS activities (including oil and gas leasing)
are consistent with approved state plans. H.R. 4589, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); S. 2324, 98th
Cong. 2d Sess. (1984). See also [15 Current Developments] ENv'T REP. (BNA) 40 (May 11, 1984).
The Ninety-Eighth Congress adjourned before enacting either of these proposals.
The Administration's response has been twofold: NOAA has sought public comment as to how
to revise its consistency regulations in the light of Secretary of the Interior v. California, and Interior
Secretary William Clark has stated that he will advise the President to veto legislation attempting
to expand the consistency requirements as interpreted by the Court. [15 Current Developments]
ENv'T REP. (BNA) 175 (June 8, 1984); [14 Current Developments] ENV'T REP. (BNA) 2212 (Apr.
6, 1984).
53. Secretary of the Interior v. California, 104 S.Ct. at 672.

January 1985]

ACCOMMODATING

TENSIONS

OCS energy development-that has become the central focus of the CZM
movement.
It may well be that, for two key reasons, 1984 will be cited as a turning
point in the history of the U.S. CZM program. First, the year opened
with the Supreme Court finally putting to rest a controversy that in many
ways diverted energy and attention away from the substantive goals and
achievements of the federal-state cooperative scheme. Members of Congress, commentators, advocates, and bureaucrats alike were embroiled
in the elaborate tug-of-war over the meanings of one statutory clause, a
clause that to many represented the heart of CZM. While the future holds
in store more debates over proposed amendments to CZMA to clarify
consistency," there is still a marked shift away from past contexts and
interpretations and toward the needs and desires of CZM policymakers
in the late 1980s.
Second, the year closed with reports of a severe decline in interest in
offshore leasing, most notably off the New England coast, but also in the
Beaufort Sea off Alaska.57 Declining world oil prices, state opposition,
unsuccessful explorations, and lengthy legal diversions have all contributed to a lack of interest in the very plan that has been the chief CZM
battleground. 8
If, indeed, these "distractions" are eliminated or significantly downplayed, and if the CZMA is reauthorized as scheduled in 1985, perhaps
the federal CZM experiment can go on relatively unhindered for the
remainder of the decade. As Lord Byron and the history of CZM so far
suggest, however, external and internal tensions are the price we pay for
attempts to control-or to accommodate and balance-the use and abuse
of our magnetic and abundant coast.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Berger & Saurenman, The Role of CoastalStates in Outer Continental Shelf Oil
and Gas Leasing: A Litigation Perspective, 3 VA. J. OF NAT. RESOURCE L. 35 (1983); Harvey,
Federal Consistency and OCS Oil and GasDevelopment: A Review andAssessment of the "Directly
Affecting" Controversy, 13 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. J. 481 (1984); Miller, Offshore Federalism:
Evolving Federal-StateRelations in Offshore Oil and Gas Development, 11 ECOLOGY L. Q. 401
(1984); Note, The Seaweed Rebellion: Federal-State Conflicts Over Offshore Oil and Gas Development, 18 Wn.LAmrE L. REv. 535 (1982); Comment, The Seaweed Rebellion Revisisted: Continuing Federal-StateConflict in OCS Oil and Gas Leasing, 20 WILLAMErE L. REv. 83 (1984).
56. See supra note 52.
57. [15 Current Developments] ENv'T REP. (BNA) 842 (Sept. 28, 1984); Shabecoff, The Quest
for Offshore Oil Wanes, N.Y. Times, October 7, 1984, § 3, at 8, col. 4.
58. Shabecoff, supra note 57.

